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 There is an inherent tension, not yet fully resolved in international law 
or the practice of states, between protecting state sovereignty and the 
idea of intervention across a state’s borders to respond to abuses of 
fundamental human rights within those borders. This article reviews how 
this tension has presented itself and been addressed in the different 
frames of legal and moral discourse, then turns specifically to the 
concept of sovereignty itself, examining the pre-modern conception of 
sovereignty as responsibility for the common good as offering a 
suggestive model for rethinking the concept of sovereignty toward final 
resolution of the tension between sovereignty and humanitarian 
intervention. 
I.   HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN RECENT MORAL THINKING AND 
LAW 
The term humanitarian intervention can be used to refer to two 
different kinds of circumstances. The first, which is historically older, is 
interventionary responses by outside parties after a natural disaster of 
some kind, to alleviate suffering and assist in coping with the damages 
left behind by the disaster. Though military assets may be employed in 
the provision of such relief, their function is not specifically military but 
parallels that of international agencies, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in responding to the 
humanitarian needs left in the wake of the natural disaster, and their 
target is not the political structures of the affected state but the needs of 
the affected populace. While the government of the area of the disaster 
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may accept or reject particular aspects of such efforts, no fundamental 
controversy attends the provision of aid in the wake of such disasters. 
Controversy does, though, attend a different use of the term 
humanitarian intervention: to refer to measures taken by outside parties 
to respond to crises involving serious harm to basic human rights, to 
protect the affected population from such harm, to remove the sources of 
that harm, and perhaps to punish those responsible for it in the past. Such 
measures may include a range of possible means, up to and including the 
use of military force; yet even when the interventionary means chosen 
are, say, economic, political, or legal, the possibility of use of military 
force remains as a further option. Humanitarian intervention in this sense 
is still relatively recent. Legally, it depends fundamentally on the 
emergence of international human rights law and the framework it 
provides for identifying harm needing amelioration other than the 
physical harm caused by natural disasters. Politically, it depends on the 
ending of the Cold War and the new international environment in which 
use of military force can be contemplated and carried through without 
triggering a third world war. Morally, its roots reach deeply into Western 
religious and philosophical values, and the best moral reflection seeks to 
draw out the implications of those values. Pragmatically, though, much 
recent moral assessment has also depended on the emergence of news 
reporting presenting real-time evidence of humanitarian abuses and the 
resulting harm, together with evidence of who is responsible. The 
controversy over humanitarian intervention in this sense arises from two 
directions: such intervention by use of military force may be argued to 
constitute aggression, forbidden in international law; and use of military 
force to respond to humanitarian need caused by the actions of particular 
parties—often the government of the affected state—is difficult or even 
impossible to separate from regime change and/or bringing those persons 
responsible to justice under international criminal law. Recent 
international law, centered on the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, 
has attempted to find an understanding of humanitarian intervention by 
means up to and involving military force that does not run afoul of the 
prohibition against aggression and that includes a satisfactory 
relationship to international criminal law; yet debate continues over 
whether, as matters now stand, the problematic issues have been 
resolved. Moral as well as legal issues are at stake in this debate because 
moral concerns have, from the beginning, been at the center of the 
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conception of humanitarian intervention to protect vulnerable 
populations from severe oppression.  
Historically, benchmark examples of moral reflection on humanitarian 
intervention involving military force were offered by both the two major 
American thinkers, the theological ethicist Paul Ramsey and the political 
philosopher Michael Walzer, whose work on the just war idea initiated 
the revival of this idea as a focus for moral consideration of the use of 
military force.  
Ramsey, in a chapter titled “The Ethics of Intervention” in his 1968 
book, The Just War,1 writing in the historical context of the early years of 
the Vietnam War, sought to identify the moral parameters for military 
intervention. He never used the term “humanitarian intervention,” for it 
was not yet at that time in general use, but the parameters he identified 
for military intervention clearly included humanitarian concerns. His 
position on military intervention was forthright: though it is not always 
the “most choiceworthy” form of intervention, nonetheless it is “among 
the rights and duties of states unless and until this is supplanted by 
superior government.”2 No such government in fact exists, he continued, 
and moreover, “[t]he primary reality of the present age is that the United 
States has had responsibility thrust upon it for more of the order and 
realized justice in the world than it has the power to effectuate.”3 Thus, 
on his reasoning, the right of intervention follows not from the power, 
but from the responsibility to intervene in the cause of justice. As to the 
justifications needed for any particular intervention, Ramsey divided 
these into two sorts, the “ultimate” or “just war” grounds4 and the 
“penultimate” or “secondary” ones.5 The former include four 
considerations: the requirements of justice, order (both “terminal goals . . 
. in proper politics”), and service to both the national and the 
international common good, which need to be weighed separately and 
maximized in relation to each other. This last pair of criteria reflects the 
overall purpose of the use of justified armed force according to the just 
war idea, namely, service of the common good. But, as Ramsey 
presented them, they also involve considerations of proportionality, 
  
 1. PAUL RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR 19-41 (1968).  
 2. Id. at 20.  
 3. Id. at 23.  
 4. Id. at 27-33. 
 5. Id. at 33-38. 
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which have loomed large in just war thinking from Ramsey forward to 
the present. Ramsey assumed here that what is justice can be universally 
known, if imperfectly; his argument was that even if imperfect, an 
approximation of justice is better than no effort at securing justice at all. 
The statesman, Ramsey concluded, “must determine what he ought to do 
from out of the total humanitarian ought to be.”6 Despite not using the 
term “humanitarian intervention,” this makes it clear that he is thinking 
of intervention justified by humanitarian concerns.  
Order, for Ramsey, must serve justice, which is the higher moral goal. 
His discussion of order turns to the subject of law, both domestic and 
international. Law, Ramsey comments, comprises “mankind’s attempt to 
impose some coherence upon the order of power. But such coherence 
flows also from the justice that may be preserved, beyond or beneath the 
legalities.”7 This statement can imply that a principled action in the 
service of justice may trump the requirements of law, and indeed, 
Ramsey’s discussion as a whole trends in this direction, especially with 
regard to international law, which he regards as deficient by comparison 
with domestic law, with the former’s legalities “far more imperfect” and 
“the social due process for changing the legal system . . . even more 
wanting.”8  
The discussion of law, in Ramsey’s discussion, points directly to what 
he calls the “penultimate” grounds for military intervention, which are in 
fact the two grounds allowed in international law: counter-intervention 
and intervention by invitation. The logic of his argument and the nature 
of his terminology both imply that these formal allowances are not the 
primary considerations for him: those considerations are justice, an order 
that serves justice, and the domestic and international common good. 
Elsewhere, in a discussion of my own on intervention,9 I have defined 
this matter of serving the common good more broadly, noting that in any 
interventionary action the intervening state must balance three distinct, if 
interrelated, kinds of competing responsibilities: obligations to the 
international order, including maintaining the territorial ideal of 
sovereignty defined in the UN Charter and serving the ideal of 
  
 6. Id. at 29-30. 
 7. Id. at 30.  
 8. Id. at 31.  
 9. JAMES T. JOHNSON, MORALITY AND CONTEMPORARY WARFARE 103-16 
(1999).  
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international consensus for such action; obligations to the domestic 
community(ies) of the state(s) that would intervene; and obligations to 
the society or societies targeted for intervention. My point is, I think, 
essentially an extension of Ramsey’s: serving justice in any given 
instance of military intervention, including but not exclusive to 
humanitarian intervention, involves seeking to honor several sorts of 
obligations, both moral and legal, which are in some tension with one 
another. Intervention is inherently not an easy moral call. But in the end 
the law needs to be interpreted with reference to the moral values it 
serves or fails to serve, and the moral values are complex and often in 
competition with one another.  
Nine years after Ramsey, Michael Walzer offered his own reflective 
analysis of the subject of intervention in a chapter of his book, Just and 
Unjust Wars.10 Whereas Ramsey had worked centrally from the moral 
value of justice, Walzer began in this chapter with the frame set by what 
he called the “legalist paradigm” of international order, which he had 
earlier defined in six propositions: 
1. There exists an international society of independent states. 
2. This international society has a law that establishes the rights of its 
members—above all, the rights of territorial integrity and political 
sovereignty. 
3.  Any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against 
the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another constitutes 
aggression and is a criminal act. 
4. Aggression justifies two kinds of violent response: a war of self-
defense by the victim and a war of law enforcement by the victim and 
any other member of international society. 
5. Nothing but aggression can justify war. 
6. Once the aggressor state has been repelled, it can also be 
punished.
11
  
  
 10. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 86-108 (1977).  
 11. Id. at 61-62. 
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This listing establishes a rather different tone regarding international 
law from that of Ramsey’s discussion, and it raises to central position 
two major concerns not specifically addressed by Ramsey: the territorial 
conception of sovereignty and the idea of aggression as any use of force 
that violates “the political sovereignty or territorial integrity” of another 
state. This legal definition of sovereignty implies prima facie a general 
principle of nonintervention by any state or body of states in the internal 
affairs of any other state. Between Ramsey’s concentration on justice, 
then, and that of the “legalist paradigm” on sovereignty, there appears a 
fundamental tension that ever since has complicated efforts to deal with 
the matter of humanitarian intervention. Given that such intervention 
may occur without the approval of the targeted state or even against its 
will, and that the government of the targeted state may itself be 
responsible directly or indirectly for the humanitarian need that 
occasions the intervention, does the use of military force for the purpose 
of such intervention constitute aggression or not? This is a fundamental 
question, and I return to it and possibilities for its resolution later in this 
paper. For now, the question is where Walzer takes his discussion of 
intervention from this beginning-point.  
The short answer is that he moves in the same direction Ramsey had 
taken, but through reference to different moral principles, writing, “those 
conceptions of life and liberty which underlie the paradigm and make it 
plausible . . . seem also to require that we sometimes disregard the 
principle” of nonintervention.12 (Later in the chapter he also invokes the 
value of justice.) He continues, offering his own resolution of the tension 
identified above:  
No state can admit to fighting an aggressive war and then defend its 
actions. But intervention is differently understood. The word is not 
defined as a criminal activity, and though the practice of intervening 
often threatens the territorial integrity and political independence of 
invaded states, it can sometimes be justified. . . . [I]t always has to be 
justified.
13
 
Walzer argues that there are three kinds of cases in which the 
prohibition of cross-border uses of military force “does not seem to serve 
  
 12. Id. at 86. 
 13. Id.  
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the purpose” for which it was intended: intervention in civil wars in 
states where there are two or more political communities, when one 
community resorts to force for the purpose of secession or “national 
liberation”; counter-intervention in a conflict to offset a prior 
intervention by another power; and intervention to counter extreme 
violations of human rights by fighters in the course of an armed conflict 
or by a government against some or all of its people.14 These three kinds 
of cases provide exceptions to the prima facie rule against intervention. 
Walzer does not mention “intervention by invitation,” in which a 
government invites another power to intervene in an armed conflict on its 
side, though he does mention counter-intervention. These are the two 
exceptions noted by Ramsey as “penultimate” grounds for intervention. 
Following his general practice in this book, Walzer further explores each 
of the three kinds of cases he identifies through historical examples: for 
the first, the Hungarian revolution of 1848-49; for the second, the 
American intervention in the war in Vietnam; and for the third, the 
United States’ intervention in Cuba in 1898 and that of India in 
Bangladesh in 1971. It is not to our purpose here to examine his analysis 
of these cases in detail, but I have done so in another context.15 Readers 
may agree with the analysis he provides of these historical examples or 
disagree with it (as I do in particular respects), but the point to note for 
the present is that his purpose in this analysis is dual: to interpret the 
history and to make a moral argument. In regard to the latter, the aim is 
essentially like Ramsey’s effort to discern “politically embodied justice” 
in the case at hand, though his method is different and the values to 
which he refers his moral judgments are not the same. The important 
point for us to note is that Walzer, like Ramsey, argues that moral 
reasons determine when military intervention does not violate the terms 
of the “legalist paradigm.”  
There is, of course, a contrary case, and neither of these thinkers is 
interested in it: the case that the law is the law and violating it for 
whatever justification is forbidden. For Walzer this would mean denying 
that the obligations imposed by the law are merely prima facie but 
exception-less; for Ramsey it would mean denying that there is any 
higher moral reference point for justice beyond what the law establishes. 
  
 14. Id. at 90.  
 15. JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 83-88. 
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If either is the case, room for humanitarian intervention would be 
severely limited or nonexistent, so long as the law remains the same. 
Walzer takes the opposite tack, arguing that the problem is with the law, 
and it should be changed or reinterpreted. His argument about this is 
spread over several pages, and his position is not finally stated until the 
end of the chapter. The argument begins with a stark judgment: 
“Governments and armies engaged in massacres are readily identifiable 
as criminal governments and armies (they are guilty, under the 
Nuremberg code of ‘crimes against humanity’).” He continues, “We 
worry that, under the cover of humanitarian intervention, states will 
come to coerce and dominate their neighbors,” and he observes that 
accordingly “many lawyers prefer to stick to the [legalist] paradigm,” 
arguing that “[h]umanitarian intervention ‘belongs in the realm not of 
law but of moral choice, which nations, like individuals, must sometimes 
make.’”16 He rejects this position, arguing that the law should provide a 
criterion for judgment of a particular state action. The law needs to 
embody morality; they should not be viewed as two separate realms. As 
he pursues his analysis, he writes, “humanitarian intervention is justified 
when it is a response . . . to acts ‘that shock the moral conscience of 
mankind’”17 and drives to this conclusion: “The legalist paradigm indeed 
rules out such efforts, but that only suggests that the paradigm, 
unrevised, cannot account for the moral realities of intervention.”18 
Implicit here is that the paradigm should in fact be revised to take 
account of the need for humanitarian intervention in the sort of extreme 
cases noted.  
The sticking point, of course, is that the prohibition of cross-border 
uses of armed force as aggression serves to prevent other evils: coercion 
and domination of the target state under cover of humanitarian purpose. 
The problem, though, is that, as Walzer observes at the beginning of his 
discussion of humanitarian intervention, “clear examples of what I have 
called ‘humanitarian intervention’ are very rare. Indeed, I have not found 
any, but only mixed cases where the humanitarian motive is one among 
several.”19 In the following pages20 he provides several tests to be applied 
  
 16. WALZER, supra note 10, at 106. 
 17. Id. at 107. 
 18. Id. at 108.  
 19. Id. at 101.  
 20. Id. at 103-06. 
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to ostensible cases of humanitarian intervention to help determine 
whether they are really so. Any revision of the law would have to be 
crafted so as to sort out mixed motives and prevent coercion and 
domination. Walzer does not offer language for a possible revision, and 
it might be observed that ruling out coercion and domination is exactly 
what the language of Article 2(4) of the Charter seems, on its face, to do, 
prohibiting “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state.” Regarding any and all threats or 
uses of force against a state as “aggression” can be argued to go beyond 
this specific language. Defining aggression according to the language of 
the Charter clearly aims to prevent uses of force for coercion and 
domination, though when aggression is understood to mean any and all 
cross-border threat or use of military force, humanitarian intervention 
involving military force appears as aggression. 
Both Ramsey and Walzer wrote in the historical context of the war in 
Vietnam. After the American involvement in this war ended, American 
and other Western moral reflection on the use of armed force shifted to 
other concerns than intervention until after the end of the Cold War and 
the emergence of humanitarian crises, especially those of the wars of the 
breakup of Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide of 1994. An important 
moral statement in this context was provided by the United States 
Catholic bishops’ “reflection” on the tenth anniversary of their pastoral 
letter, The Challenge of Peace.21 That pastoral letter had not treated the 
subject of intervention at all; its focus was nuclear weapons. The 1993 
statement, though, devoted considerable space to humanitarian 
intervention, defined by the bishops as “the forceful, direct intervention 
by one or more states or international organizations in the internal affairs 
of other states for essentially humanitarian purposes,” including 
alleviation of “internal chaos, repression and widespread loss of life.” 
Such intervention, the statement observes, was termed “obligatory” by 
Pope John Paul II in situations “where the survival of populations and 
entire ethnic groups is seriously compromised.”22 The statement 
  
 21. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: 
GOD’S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE (1983), available at  
http://www.usccb.org/upload/challenge-peace-gods-promise-our-response-1983.pdf. 
 22. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE HARVEST OF JUSTICE 
IS SOWN IN PEACE 15 (1993), available at  
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continues with a longer quote from John Paul II: when diplomatic and 
other procedures short of force have failed, and  
nevertheless, populations are succumbing to the attacks of an unjust 
aggressor, states no longer have a ‘right to indifference.’ It seems clear 
that their duty is to disarm this aggressor, if all other means have 
proved ineffective. The principles of sovereignty of states and of 
noninterference in their internal affairs . . . cannot constitute a screen 
behind which torture and murder may be carried out.
23
 
This papal language turns the concern expressed by Walzer about 
violating the prohibition of aggression on its head and shifts the burden 
of responsibility away from avoiding that violation to the obligation to 
meet the humanitarian need. The problem, as defined here, is not that of 
aggression being cloaked as humanitarian intervention, but that of 
serious oppression and harm aimed at elements of a state’s population 
being cloaked in the principles of state sovereignty and noninterference 
in internal affairs. For the Pope, and the U.S. bishops in turn, there is an 
overriding moral responsibility for any and all states to act to end severe 
oppression and harm, and the government of the state affected may not 
appeal to the principles of sovereignty and noninterference for cover.  
These papal statements and the U.S. bishops’ seconding them for the 
matter of debate over humanitarian intervention by United States forces 
did not settle the matter of whether humanitarian intervention by force is 
aggression, but it provides a powerful illustration of the depth of the 
moral concerns challenging the idea that any and all uses of force across 
a national border constitute criminal actions of aggression in 
international law. Individual moral theorists like Ramsey and Walzer 
might be ignored, but it was hard to ignore the papal voice.  
The moral arguments I have sketched were echoed in other contexts 
and provide a background for the emergence of the idea of the 
responsibility to protect, and continuing moral argumentation has been 
part of the debate over this idea and how it might be implemented. The 
focus here, as in the earlier discussions sketched above, has been on the 
justifications for humanitarian intervention, not on the conception of 
  
http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catholic-social-
teaching/the-harvest-of-justice-is-sown-in-peace.cfm.  
 23. Id. at 25-26. 
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sovereignty, though how this concept is understood is crucial for both the 
legal and moral status of such intervention. A closer look at the idea of 
sovereignty itself is needed to move the debates further. 
II.  STATE SOVEREIGNTY: ITS CONCEPTION, EXTENT, AND EFFORTS AT 
LIMITATION 
The idea of sovereignty in current international law and most political 
and moral usage refers to a quality of the state and of the international 
system based on states that historically is identified with the European 
international order that came out of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia (“the 
Westphalian system”) and is currently legally defined by the United 
Nations Charter.24 In the latter, the language of Article 2(4) is critical, 
prohibiting “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state.” With regard to the matter of 
intervention of any sort, this is reinforced by the language of Article 
2(7): “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state.” Yet also relevant to what lies within 
the scope of such matters is the language of Article 2(2), which charges 
all Members of the United Nations to “fulfill in good faith the obligations 
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.”  
As to the Peace of Westphalia, three major points loom large in 
relation to the conception of sovereignty and its limits: the recognition by 
all parties to the Peace of the principle of cuius regio,eius religio, first 
established in the 1555 Peace of Augsburg and guaranteeing the right of 
the ruler to establish an officially supported religion within each state; 
notwithstanding this, recognition of the right of free practice of religion 
to Christians living in states where another faith is the established 
religion; and recognition by all parties of each party’s sovereignty over 
its lands, its population, and its agents abroad. These three points 
anticipate the provisions just cited from the UN Charter, though the first 
two, because of the historical context, have to do specifically with the 
practice of religion. More broadly, the first point affirms the right of 
states to regulate their domestic affairs, while the second sets a limit on 
this—here, the recognition of the right of free choice of religious practice 
  
 24. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
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by dissenting Christian groups—by mutual agreement of the parties. The 
third point defines sovereignty in terms of territory and the population 
living within that territory. This was a relatively new understanding of 
sovereignty, though one which responded well to the circumstances of 
the age. These parallels with Article 2 of the Charter are important to 
note, as they show the continuity in this understanding of sovereignty 
throughout the modern period. Let us look more closely at each of these 
matters.25 
The second and third points established in the Peace of Westphalia 
were innovations in treaty law on the practice of statecraft in 1648, and 
the intellectual roots of the conception of sovereignty provided here first 
appeared not much earlier, in the work of Hugo Grotius (particularly his 
De Jure Belli ac Pacis, first published in 1625). The principle that 
exercise of sovereign powers could be limited by means of a treaty was 
much older. But to apply it to the exercise of domestic rule, not just 
interrelations with other sovereign entities broke new ground. This was 
especially striking in the context of the Peace of Westphalia because of 
the subject addressed there: religious practice and, implicitly, religious 
faith. After all, in 1648 much of Europe had been fighting indiscriminate 
and hugely destructive wars over religion for more than a century, and 
central to these wars was the very principle that came out of the earliest 
of these conflicts, the principle of cuius regio, eius religio that 
recognized the right of each ruler to set the parameters for religious faith 
and practice for his or her own domain. It is hard for us today to 
recognize how much of a cosmic shift the agreement on this principle 
was at the time, for though in general terms it affirmed the right of a ruler 
to determine domestic policy, historically choice of religion was not a 
matter of such policy; here, the principle made religious faith and 
practice a matter for regulation within the sphere of temporal political 
order, not something to be determined by a superior spiritual authority. 
But by itself this principle turned out to sow the seeds of further conflict, 
because dissenting minorities in each political community could appeal 
to the transcendent content of their own faith to resist the temporal 
ruler’s disallowing any form of religious faith and practice than the one 
  
 25. Cf. JAMES T. JOHNSON, SOVEREIGNTY: MORAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 
81-100 (2014). 
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chosen as the religion of the state, and neighboring rulers sharing the 
faith of the dissenters could intervene militarily on their behalf, giving 
rise to new wars. What such dissenting minorities were asserting at the 
time was a right that up till then had never been recognized in Europe, 
the right of free choice of religion, and in effect, the powers that 
intervened on their behalf were engaged in an effort to protect this 
right—though they certainly did not conceive their action in this way. To 
remove the temptation for war over religion, the idea of toleration of 
dissenting belief and practice introduced in the Peace of Westphalia was 
a necessary accompaniment to the principle of cuius regio, eius religio, 
expressing the agreement among the parties to the Peace that they were 
not going to fight over religious practices in one another’s states any 
more. Given the devastation, suffering, and loss of life that warfare over 
religion had caused over the previous three generations and more, the 
need to limit the power of the state expressed in cuius regio, eius religio 
in this way was eminently understandable and desirable, and the 
provisions of the Peace quickly became customary law throughout 
Europe.  
But this way of resolving the problem of warfare over religion also 
left a tension. On the one hand the governing authorities of each political 
community were affirmed to have the right to establish a given form of 
religion for that political community; this was a matter of the 
responsibility of government to regulate the domestic affairs of that 
community. On the other hand, these authorities were to allow dissenting 
Christian communities to practice their own form of religious faith. In 
the frame of treaty law, this latter was a limit on the former established 
by the positive agreement of each party to the treaty. Keeping to the 
agreement was a matter of the recognition by each party that doing so 
was in its own self-interest, but there was also the possibility of external 
enforcement by the other parties, if the agreement were violated by one 
party. That is, in this context, the implicit acknowledgement of a right to 
religious freedom was not embraced as such: toleration of dissident 
forms of religion was simply a formal treaty obligation, with adherence 
enforced as in any other treaty.  
But this tolerance of religious difference easily gave rise to a 
conception of the right to religious freedom, and from the perspective of 
this right, it was unique in being created and protected, however 
implicitly, by a treaty among great and small states. By 1648 there was a 
long tradition of rights in European political and legal thought and 
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practice, with some rights being identified as rooted in natural law and 
others being created by consensual practices in particular communities. 
These could sometimes be in conflict: Grotius might argue for the 
defense of the “ancient rights and privileges” of the Dutch people in 
seeking their independence from Spanish rule, but apologists for that rule 
could counter this by citing the right of the Spanish King, defined in 
natural law, to govern so as to maximize the order, justice, and peace of 
everyone subject to that government. In the scholarly literature that 
treated such matters in the late Middle Ages and early Modern period, 
including the code of canon law, secular legal works, and theological 
reflection, many of the rights in question were never defined with 
specificity, and interpreting what they might require in any given 
instance was left to informed judgment. Most often this meant the 
judgment of the sovereign ruler, the temporal ruler with no temporal 
superior, for in just war tradition and the theory of politics associated 
with it from the late twelfth through the early sixteenth centuries 
sovereignty was understood as a personal quality of such a ruler and 
referred both to his status as judge of last resort in all cases of disputes 
and his responsibility to provide for the well-being of the whole society 
ruled (defined as its order, justice, and peace). This responsibility also 
included recognition and protection of the rights of those governed. An 
individual or a group might validly seek redress for violations of their 
rights, but if they disagreed with the sovereign ruler’s judgment, they 
might not carry their efforts so far as to become sedition, which was 
understood as a mortal sin. On the other hand, a ruler had real 
responsibilities toward the individuals and the community governed, and 
any ruler who sought his own good rather than that of the community 
was a tyrant, unfit to rule, who ultimately was subject to removal.  
This was, in sum, the idea of sovereignty that existed in Western 
thought and practice before the triumph of the Grotian-Westphalian 
alternative conception. The older understanding of sovereignty had 
coalesced as part of the same intellectual, legal, and political processes 
that produced a coherent, systematic idea of just war, and the two ideas, 
just war and sovereignty as responsibility, were closely related. Their 
intellectual roots were the same: classical political philosophy, which 
provided among other ideas the conception of politics as properly 
oriented toward the three goods of order, justice, and peace; the recovery 
of Roman law, which provided understandings of natural law, Roman 
law, and ius gentium and their interrelationship; the Gelasian principle, 
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which distinguished temporal authority from spiritual and defined the 
responsibility for political life in each community and the interactions 
among political communities, as belonging to the former; and the 
recovery of Aristotelian thinking, which as interpreted in Scholastic 
theology pulled all this together in a single intellectual synthesis. The 
thinking behind this synthesis was developed in the context of the 
realities of political order and relationships as they presented themselves. 
The same people were involved in reflection on just war and the idea of 
sovereignty: canon lawyers, civil lawyers, theologians, and not least 
temporal authorities engaged in government and military affairs. Their 
thought blended easily into a broadly recognized consensus. 
The idea of just war that resulted was summarized in its classic form 
by Aquinas (building on the work of three generations of canonists 
before him) as requiring the authority of a prince, a just cause pertaining 
to the rectification of injustice and the punishment of wrongdoing, and 
the end of peace within and among political communities.26 “Prince” (in 
Latin, princeps) here referred to a temporal ruler with no temporal 
superior; this same office was described in contemporaneous French and 
English as souverain, “sovereign.” The responsibility of such a ruler was 
thus the definition of sovereignty: the personal moral responsibility to 
seek the common good.  
Yet how to respond to the opposite of sovereignty defined this way, 
tyrannical rule? Aquinas, again, on guard lest resistance become sedition, 
urged subjects to bear up under tyranny if it was not too bad to bear. 
Determining whether an individual ruler was a tyrant and, if so, when 
and how to remove him, was a matter for other sovereigns in their role as 
judges of last resort in the interpretation and application of the natural 
law—or possibly within the community for a subordinate authority who 
might justifiably claim to have the right to exercise the responsibilities of 
a sovereign over the tyrant because of the latter’s abdication of such 
responsibility. Aquinas, in arguing this, was taking a position not far 
different from that defined by John Calvin two and a half centuries later.  
In this tradition of thought there were understood to be ultimate 
standards for political rule and for individual behavior, standards 
established in the law of nature. Responsibility, whether in personal life 
  
 26. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I/II Q.40, art. 1, available at  
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or in government, was understood in terms of the parameters set in this 
law. This meant, among other things, that in the exercise of 
governmental responsibility a sovereign ruler might act against a tyrant 
in another political community, but that same ruler could also act 
internally against sedition. The former action was valid only insofar as it 
served to reestablish a just, and therefore peaceful, order within the 
political community affected. The latter was justified only so long as it 
did not itself rise to the level of tyranny. However vague these standards 
may seem today, they were nonetheless standards generally accepted, 
and so long as the cultural consensus in which they were rooted held, the 
system worked. 
The Modern Age, though, brought challenges from several quarters to 
this fund of commonality. The encounter with the Indians of the New 
World presented Europeans with cultures that held significantly different 
conceptions of the proper nature of all things, thus challenging the 
European conception of natural law as common across all humankind 
and knowable by reason by everyone regardless of cultural background. 
Even more importantly, the common culture of Europe itself was divided 
by the emergence of the Protestant Reformation. The former challenge 
took a while to have effect; the effect of the latter was more immediate 
and more traumatic. While the just war tradition had rejected use of 
armed force for religious conversion,27 it understood attacks on religion 
as forbidden in natural law and regarded the use of armed force to 
counter such attacks as justified. So when a sovereign ruler faced threats 
or attacks against the form of Christianity he favored, he understood 
himself to have the right and the obligation to act to defend it. But the 
same right of self-defense of religion applied to the dissenters and those 
who might come to their aid. Warfare resulted between Catholic and 
Protestant rulers and people. Against this background, the principle cuius 
regio, eius religio was not an advance but a statement of the status quo. 
Undercutting the grounds for interreligious warfare required something 
different, and this is what Grotius provided by reframing elements from 
the inherited tradition.28 
  
 27. Cf. FRANCISCUS DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE JURE BELLI RELECTIONES (1917) 
[Sect. 10: “Difference of religion is not a cause of just war“]. 
 28. JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 81-100. 
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First, Grotius returned to the idea of self-defense as permitted in 
natural law. The inherited tradition had understood self-defense as a 
natural right of everyone, from individuals to political communities, but 
only when the attack is imminent or already under way.29 On this 
understanding just war, bellum iustum, had to do with rectifying an 
injustice and punishing wrongdoing after the wrongdoing had been 
accomplished. It was the sovereign’s responsibility to determine when 
this was the case and to authorize force, if needed, to rectify the injustice 
and punish whoever was responsible for it. In the context of the situation 
in Europe after the beginning of the Reformation, not only self-defense 
against an attack against religion but also the responsibility to respond to 
the injustice it represented made for war based in religious difference. 
Grotius shifted the ground away from the assumptions in the inherited 
tradition, arguing that the natural law is clear only in cases of self-
defense against an imminent or ongoing attack and that use of armed 
force is justified only to prevent or defend against such an attack. He thus 
took rectification of injustice and punishment of those responsible for 
injustice off the table with regard to justification of using armed force 
(though he reintroduced them in a later context in his discussion of 
postliminy). Moreover, he followed the same reasoning as others in the 
half-century before him in arguing that the authority of the ruler to act on 
behalf of the people’s common good was drawn from this right of the 
people to be left alone, in person and property, to pursue their own best 
interests. On this reconstruction, sovereignty became no longer a 
property of the ruler defined by that person’s moral responsibility to the 
natural law, but a property of the political community as a whole, defined 
in terms of the people making up the community, their “rights and 
privileges,” and the territory they inhabited. On this conception the most 
fundamental measure of injustice was any attack across the territorial 
boundaries of a political community, and so the idea of sovereignty 
became defined with the responsibility to protect those borders. Any 
cross-border use of force thus constituted an injustice. With this way of 
thinking we encounter the modern conception of sovereignty, leading 
ultimately to the language of Article 2 of the UN Charter.  
  
 29. See GREGORY REICHBERG, HENRIK SYSE, & ENDRE BEGBY, THE ETHICS OF 
WAR: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 150 (2006); but cf. JOHNSON, supra note 
25, at 28-60.  
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What was gained in this shift was, first, to remove the justifications 
provided in the inherited tradition for use of force to punish and rectify a 
state’s infringement of the right of religious practice by persons 
dissenting from the established religion. The right to resist such 
infringement on the spot remained in the narrowing of the right to use 
force for self-defense; this, however, was countered by the assertion of 
individual rights as basic to the conception of sovereignty. The 
agreement to grant religious toleration in the Peace of Westphalia 
expressed this understanding.  
In context these were very important gains, and their importance is 
attested by the strength of this conception of sovereignty over for what is 
now close to 500 years. But there were also losses. The older tradition 
had defined sovereignty in terms of each ruler’s personal moral 
responsibility to uphold universal moral requirements defined in the 
natural law. But when European society split, the consensus as to what 
the natural law required suffered; this was why Grotius had to reduce the 
role of natural law in his own thinking to the matter of the right of self-
defense against attack. This left the responsibility of those in positions of 
rule as defined only in terms of protecting the majority of those ruled 
from threat or attack. The idea of responsibility for the common good 
thus became refocused so as not to include persons in the community 
who could be viewed as threats to the good of the majority and of the 
political community as a whole. This pointed in the direction of “might 
makes right,” with the rights of minorities ignored as members of 
minority groups were subjected to whatever forms of disadvantage they 
might be made to suffer, whether by the ruling authorities or by members 
of the majority.  
In the context of the Peace of Westphalia, the rights of religious 
minorities to free choice and expression of religion was protected by 
agreement among the parties to the Peace, and as noted earlier, this 
protection spread throughout Western societies, not just those parties to 
the Peace. It remained, expanded into a more general conception of right 
behavior towards people generally in both developing thought on the law 
of nations and in what came to be called “customary law.”  These 
protections were not, however, always observed in relations between 
Western powers and societies and peoples in other parts of the world, 
and the door also gradually opened to their erosion in the West itself. The 
rise of ideologically driven politics (specifically Nazism and Marxist 
Communism) in the first half of the twentieth century effectively 
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returned the affected countries and peoples to a status much like that of 
the wars of the Reformation era, with specific groups of people being 
persecuted because of their ethnicity, status, or beliefs.  
In various ways, the development of international law has given 
positive expression to protections due to certain classes of people. One 
form of this is the protection given civilians, their property, and public 
property with a civilian purpose in the law of war, the law of armed 
conflict, or international humanitarian law. A second form is the idea of 
crimes against humanity in the Nuremburg Code. A third, more specific, 
form is the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide. The development of human rights law since the 
1948 Declaration of Human Rights identifies specific examples of 
human rights and provides for their protection. The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court pulls all this together summarily in its 
listing of the crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction: the first three 
are genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes; the fourth and 
last is the crime of aggression.30 Taken all together, the development of 
international law in the United Nations era has moved in the direction of 
reinstating protections eroded or lost as a result of the modern definition 
of sovereignty. But gaps remain, and even when the protections are 
defined in terms of international criminal law, enforcement of the 
protections remains a problem. Humanitarian intervention offers a 
response, but it introduces problems of its own.  
III. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT INITIATIVE AND THE CONCEPTION 
OF SOVEREIGNTY 
As the idea of the responsibility to protect has developed in 
international law and in legal and moral debate, it provides another kind 
of example of the effort given to positive expression in international law 
to basic standards understood historically as universal moral standards. 
The original formal statement of this idea appeared in the report of the ad 
hoc International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
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(ICISS) under the title, The Responsibility To Protect.31 It directly linked 
sovereignty to responsibility, as in the pre-modern conception of 
sovereignty described above, describing the “primary responsibility” as 
protection by each state of its people.32 Yet the occasion for the work of 
ICISS was, after all, the serious failures of states to exercise this 
responsibility in a number of cases. Accordingly, the initial linking of 
sovereignty to state responsibility was followed by the assertion that in 
cases in which a state, for whatever reason, fails to discharge this 
responsibility “the principle of non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect.”33 The core of the Report has to do 
with justifying this argument and laying out the conditions for military 
intervention.  
On its understanding of sovereignty, despite its definition in a way 
that corresponds to the pre-modern conception of sovereignty, the ICISS 
Report does not acknowledge the pre-modern understanding of 
sovereignty, rather presenting sovereignty as responsibility as a recently 
developing concept resulting from “[e]volving international law” and 
particularly “the emerging concept of human security.”34 It continues: 
“The defence of state sovereignty, by even its strongest supporters, does 
not include any claim of the unlimited power of a state to do what it 
wants to its own people[,]” but rather “sovereignty implies a dual 
responsibility: externally—to respect the sovereignty of other states, and 
internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within 
the state.”35 In operational terms this is surely a correct accounting of the 
concept of sovereignty as responsibility for the good of each state’s 
populace, for positive international law is currently understood as the 
product of formal agreement among states. Yet earlier positive law was 
understood as reflecting an underlying value consensus, as in the 
evocation of the “interests of humanity” and the “needs of civilization” 
in the preamble to 1907 Hague Convention IV.36 The question is how 
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such a consensus is to be known. In the pre-modern conception of 
sovereignty it rested in a broad cultural understanding of the 
requirements of natural law; as late as the 1907 Hague Conventions, it 
still reflected common values held across Western societies; today, such 
common understandings can be discerned through what states agree to in 
their interrelations. There is less difference between these two extremes 
than may appear at first look. When agreements occur, that signals 
deeper value commonality.  
What this Report calls the external dimension of sovereignty is in fact 
the conception of sovereignty first defined by Grotius and 
operationalized in the Westphalian system. So far as other sovereign 
entities are concerned, it is fundamentally territorial in character, and one 
sovereign entity may not reach across the borders of another to try to 
influence its internal affairs. This leads to both the norm of non-
intervention and the conception of such action as aggression. There 
remains a very basic and serious tension between this understanding of 
sovereignty and that defined in terms of internal responsibility, and to 
simply lay them side by side as “dual” responsibilities, as in the ICISS 
Report, does not resolve the inherent tension. The problem expressed in 
this tension is that each of these conceptions of sovereignty serves 
different fundamental values. An ultimate resolution of the tension would 
involve finding a frame in which these different values are reconciled. 
The ICISS Report does not do this, instead opting for describing 
sovereignty as the responsibility to protect as trumping sovereignty as 
non-intervention.  
The majority of the ICISS Report in fact has to do with spelling out 
the terms of this option—the conditions for humanitarian intervention by 
military force. Once again, its basic expression of these conditions 
evokes and parallels a tradition of moral thought: the summary of 
“Principles for Military Intervention” employs the categories of the just 
war idea as they appear in recent reflection and reflects their 
organization: “just cause,” several “precautionary principles,” and “right 
authority.” Whereas much recent just war thinking follows the Charter in 
defining just cause as self-defense against aggression, understood as the 
threat or use of military force against a state, the ICISS Report defines it 
in terms of violations of the internal obligations of sovereignty, 
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expressed in “large scale loss of life” and “large scale ‘ethnic 
cleansing.’”37 When these two descriptions of just cause are laid 
alongside each other, the contradiction between them is stark: military 
action to respond to these internal violations involves a violation of the 
sort that justifies military action to repel it. The ICISS Report attempts to 
sidestep this contradiction by limiting intervention for the purposes cited 
to “extreme and exceptional cases,” following this with a statement about 
the importance of the principle of non-intervention.38 It is in this 
connection that the criteria for military intervention appear.39 In this 
discussion the question of authority is approached in various contexts, 
but a discrete treatment of the subject of right authority is put off till 
later.40 Both the Synopsis and the body of the Report stress the value of 
authorization of such intervention by the Security Council but leave open 
other options if the Security Council fails to act: action by the General 
Assembly, by regional organizations of states, or even, though without 
“wide favour,”41 possibly by single states. The reality, though, at the time 
of the ICISS Report, was that the most successful humanitarian 
interventions had not been U.N.-led or otherwise authorized by the 
Security Council, but rather that by NATO in Kosovo and several by 
individual states, including Vietnam in Cambodia against the army of Pol 
Pot and Tanzania in Uganda to overthrow Idi Amin. The dysfunction of 
the United Nations is nowhere noted.  
Despite the effort in the ICICC Report to establish a case for the 
responsibility to protect and humanitarian intervention to support it, 
important segments of the international community were not convinced. 
While a number of states, led by Canada, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom, reacted favorably to the Report, the Non-Aligned Movement 
rejected it, as did China and Russia. The United States took a somewhat 
different tack from these critics, refusing to bind its actions by the 
criteria given in the Report, including giving pre-commitments for 
military action in cases in which the United States had no national 
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interests.42 Debate continued, both inside and outside the context of the 
United Nations. The definition of the responsibility to protect in 
international law today stands as stated in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
2005 World Summit Outcome document.43 Paragraph 138 affirmed the 
responsibility of states to protect their populations against several 
particular kinds of harm defined as criminal in international law: 
“genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.” 
The paragraph concludes with a charge to the international community: it 
should, “as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility.” Paragraph 139 spells out more fully what should be the 
nature of this support: first, “appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and 
other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the 
Charter.” Only then does it turn to the possibility of humanitarian 
intervention by military means, described as “collective action . . . , 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including 
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant 
regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their 
populations.” But Chapter VII does not address cases of egregious 
humanitarian abuses within a state; it has to do with “Actions with 
Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of 
Aggression,” so that it would seem to allow for the use of military force 
in cases of humanitarian need only when the abuses producing that need 
rise to the level of threats or abuses of international peace or have effects 
across borders that might constitute aggression. This looks, on the face of 
it, to be very different from the kind of intervention the ICISS Report 
argued for. One critic summed up the result of the Outcome document’s 
language by noting that “it essentially provided that the Security Council 
could authorize, on a case-by-case basis, things that it had been 
authorizing for more than a decade.”44 Since this definition was reached 
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there has been only one case in which military intervention for 
humanitarian reasons has been authorized: that of Libya in 2011. 
In terms of the two ideas of sovereignty identified above, the clear 
winner here is the definition of sovereignty in terms of territorial 
inviolability and, despite the positive things said about the responsibility 
to protect endangered populations from various specific kinds of crimes 
defined in international law, the clear loser is the definition of 
sovereignty in terms of the responsibility of government to serve the 
good of its people. For what is given up is the possibility of enforcement 
of this ultimately by threat or use of military force. This is the big 
difference between the pre-modern idea of sovereignty and the definition 
of sovereignty in terms of the responsibility to protect. For the focus of 
the first was a moral responsibility of the person or persons exercising 
ruling authority. If they ignored or failed in their responsibility for the 
common good, they were no longer, in moral terms, worthy to be called 
rulers; they became tyrants. As tyrants, they could, on a case-by-case 
basis, be removed. But the debate over the responsibility to protect 
studiously steered away from its implications for regime change. That 
seemed, perhaps, a bridge too far, as it would manifest a clear example of 
interference in the internal affairs of a state. By modern political theory, 
only the populace of a state can choose its rulers, and this means that 
other states, as individual actors or up to and including the international 
community as a whole, have no right to insert themselves into the matter. 
How this works out in practice is another matter. The pre-modern 
conception of sovereignty rooted the rights of sovereignty elsewhere, and 
so it made it possible to reach a different judgment on who might or 
might not have the right to exercise ruling authority and to act 
accordingly.  
I suggest that something like this conception remains embedded in the 
thinking of various cultures about the matter of the conception of 
rulership and its responsibilities.45  This is also signaled by the language 
of paragraph 138 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, which 
states forthrightly the responsibility of each individual state—and thus 
those in governing responsibility in each state—to protect its population 
from the named kinds of harm. So far as the fundamental concern 
remains to protect vulnerable populations from harm—especially 
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egregious harm—these cultural conceptions should be explored and their 
implications examined.  
I would also note that the pre-modern conception of sovereignty as 
responsibility in the West carries significantly broader implications than 
the provisions of the Outcome document. To have responsibility for the 
common good of the society governed, as the pre-modern conception of 
sovereignty provided, is quite a broad responsibility. The common good 
here is shorthand for the three interlocked ends of political life as they 
were then conceived: order, justice, and peace. To serve these ends 
implied responsibilities to other political communities than the 
sovereign’s own, for how well neighboring societies were governed 
necessarily impinged on the governing of one’s own society. Thus, a 
ruler faithfully engaged in discharging the responsibility for the common 
good of his or her own society could not turn a blind eye to tyranny in a 
neighboring one. Tyranny, moreover, was itself a broad concept: willful 
failure to serve the responsibility to the ruler’s own political community. 
By comparison, the provisions of paragraph 138 of the Outcome 
document are much narrower, leaving room for various kinds of serious 
malfeasance beyond the particular crimes noted. The question is whether 
more can be added to this to include the kinds of harm generally 
identified in recent moral thinking on humanitarian intervention: serious 
violations of the basic human rights of affected populations. This implies 
taking a hard critical look at the law in relation to the concept of such 
rights and also with reference to such fundamental values as justice and 
peace. 
Paragraph 139 of the Outcome document may also draw the lines of 
enforcement rather too narrowly. The original iteration of the 
responsibility to protect left room, albeit with considerable caution, for 
action by individual states in case of the kind of compelling need 
identified there. The Outcome document, by contrast, explicitly reserves 
authority for such action to the Security Council and raises the bar for 
justification to that set by Chapter VII of the Charter. As observed 
earlier, the only case of humanitarian intervention on this model has been 
that in Libya; the most successful earlier examples were all by individual 
states or regional organizations. It will be, in any case, the task of 
individual states and/or regional organizations to carry out any future 
humanitarian interventions, and this suggests the need for more legal 
room for such actions. This would also be more in accord with the 
conception of sovereignty as responsibility for the national and 
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international common good, and so far as protection of basic human 
rights is defined as a core responsibility of the governments of states 
today, the door is opened toward more robust involvement by states and 
regional organizations in responding to depredations by neighbors. 
In short, while the responsibility to protect now has been given legal 
formulation, there remain questions as to whether this formulation is the 
best that can be reached. In considering this question and how possibly to 
move toward a more adequate one, the implications of the pre-modern 
idea of sovereignty as responsibility for the common good provide 
important perspective that is lacking in the conception of sovereignty 
now generally accepted.  
 
